



Government's Defence Report

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Abstract

The Government Defence Report to Parliament provides the defence policy guidelines for maintaining and developing Finland's defence capability. The Report and its implementation ensure that Finland's defence capability meets the requirements of the operating environment.

The Government Report of Foreign and Security Policy (Publications of the Finnish Government 2020:32) has examined Finland's security policy environment and presented the goals and priorities of Finnish foreign and security policy. The focus of the analysis in the Defence Report is on defence policy and on military defence. The Defence Report was prepared in a cross-governmental cooperation, and the Parliamentary Monitoring Group was regularly consulted. The Defence Report guidelines cover a time period until the end of this decade.

The Defence Report and its implementation will ensure Finland's defence capability in an operating environment that is tense and unpredictable. The implementation will create the prerequisites for developing and maintaining a defence system that encompasses the entire country and all domains; it will outline the personnel requirements and economic resources required for maintaining readiness, for training of conscripts and reservists, and for developing new capabilities; and it will steer the development of international defence cooperation and national legislation.

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Tiivistelmä

Valtioneuvoston puolustuselonteko eduskunnalle antaa puolustuspoliittiset linjaukset Suomen puolustuskyvyn ylläpidolle ja kehittämiselle. Puolustuselonteolla ja sen toimeenpanolla varmistetaan, että Suomen puolustuskyky vastaa toimintaympäristön vaatimuksiin.

Valtioneuvoston ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittisessa selonteossa (VN julkaisuja 2020:30) on arvioitu Suomen toimintaympäristöä sekä esitetty Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan painopisteet ja tavoitteet. Puolustuselonteko syventää tarkastelua puolustuspolitiikan ja sotilaallisen maanpuolustuksen näkökulmasta. Puolustuselonteko on valmisteltu poikkihallinnollisessa yhteistyössä ja sen laatimisessa on kuultu parlamentaarista seurantar ryhmää. Puolustuselonteon linjaukset ulottuvat 2020-luvun loppuun.

Puolustuselonteolla ja sen toimeenpanolla turvataan Suomen puolustuskyky jännitteisessä ja vaikeasti ennakoitavassa toimintaympäristössä, luodaan edellytykset koko maan kattavan ja kaikki operatiiviset toimintaympäristöt huomioivan puolustusjärjestelmän ylläpidolle ja kehittämiselle, linjataan valmiuden ylläpidon, asevelvollisten kouluttamisen sekä uusien suorituskykyjen kehittämisen edellyttämä henkilöstötarve ja taloudelliset voimavarat sekä ohjataan kansainvälisen puolustusyhteistyön sekä kansallisen lainsäädännön kehittämistä.

Asiasanat puolustuspolitiikka, maanpuolustus, puolustusjärjestelmät, selonteot

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Statsrådets försvarsredogörelse till riksdagen drar upp de försvarspolitiska riktlinjerna för hur den finska försvarsförmågan ska upprätthållas och utvecklas. Genom försvarsredogörelsen och genom att verkställa den säkerställer man att den finska försvarsförmågan motsvarar de krav som verksamhetsmiljön ställer.

I statsrådets utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiska redogörelse (Statsrådets publikationer 2020:31) bedöms Finlands omvärld och presenteras prioriteringarna och målen för den finska utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken. Försvarsredogörelsen fördjupar granskningen ur försvarspolitiken och det militära försvarets synvinkel. Försvarsredogörelsen har beretts genom ett tväradministrativt samarbete, och den parlamentariska uppföljningsgruppen har hört. Riktlinjerna i försvarsredogörelsen sträcker sig fram till slutet av 2020-talet.

Genom försvarsredogörelsen och verkställandet av den tryggas Finlands försvarsförmåga i en spänd och svårförutsägbar verksamhetsmiljö, skapas förutsättningar för att upprätthålla och utveckla ett försvarssystem som täcker hela landet och beaktar alla domäner, dras riktlinjer upp för det personalbehov och de ekonomiska resurser som upprätthållandet av beredskapen, utbildningen av värnpliktiga samt utvecklingen av nya förmågor förutsätter samt styrs utvecklandet av det internationella försvarssamarbetet och den nationella lagstiftningen.

Nyckelord försvarspolitik, landets försvar, försvarssystem, redogörelser

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The operating environment of Finnish defence will remain tense and unpredictable.

Broad-spectrum influencing against our society has increased and the methods used are diverse. Despite the increasingly tense international situation, Finland is not under any immediate military threat. Nonetheless, Finland must prepare for the use or the threat of use of military force against it.

Finland maintains a credible national defence and ensures sufficient resources for it. General conscription, a trained reserve, defence of the entire country and a high will to defend the country will remain the foundation of Finland's defence. A Parliamentary Committee on National Defence Obligation and Conscription was established in 2020 to review the options for developing and strengthening conscription.

The Finnish Defence Forces prepares to counter broad-spectrum influencing, together with other actors, as part of the evolving national comprehensive security model. Interagency cooperation must be further developed in the fields of cyber defence, strategic communication and information defence.

Finland's defence capability will be maintained on a level that meets the requirements of the operating environment. Finland will defend its territory and citizens using all of the society's resources. By engaging the resources of the entire society, Finland strives to prevent the use of military force or threats of military force against itself. The capabilities and readiness of Finnish defence have been developed according to the guidelines set in the previous Government Defence Report. Defence readiness requirements extend to include the cyber, space and information domains. Finland must be able to monitor all domains and, if necessary, activate necessary measures for defence.

The force structure of the Defence Forces wartime units will be reorganised. In the future, they will be divided into operational forces and local forces. Local defence will be developed into a package of military capabilities that encompasses the entire country, which will also contribute to preventing and combating broad-spectrum influencing. Local forces will be used to maintain national defence reaction capabilities nation-wide and in all security situations, to enable the effective use of operational forces, and to safeguard functions vital to society and defence. Land, maritime and air defence, and the

joint capabilities of the Defence Forces will be maintained and developed to meet the requirements of the operating environment. Cyber defence will be developed to better safeguard, not only the systems of the Defence Forces, but also other systems directly impacting defence capability. Strategic capability projects will be carried out as planned.

International defence cooperation strengthens Finland's defence capability. Issues highlighted in the cooperation are changes in the threat environment, situational awareness, military capabilities and interoperability in all security situations. Finland is strengthening its defence cooperation and developing its ability to act together with its key partners in all security situations affecting Finland. Finland will continue its active participation in international exercises and military crisis management.

The effects of digitalisation on the operating environment of defence are increasing. They highlight the importance of maintaining and developing domestic legislation, skills and technological capabilities. The defence administration will develop its competencies and capabilities for innovation and foresight, and ensure adequate resources for capability development and international research cooperation. The possibilities provided by new technologies will be harnessed in defence capability development.

The operation of the Defence Forces' critical systems will be ensured in all conditions. A well-functioning and internationally competitive Finnish defence industry contributes to the maintenance of military security of supply and the operational capability of national defence. Partners and their subcontractors have a well-established and significant role in the defence system and in ensuring the military security of supply.

The required training areas and infrastructure dictated by the tasks of the Defence Forces will, in cooperation with local actors, be maintained at a level required in all conditions. The activities of the Defence Forces are dependent on society's infrastructure. The structures needed by national defence and military security of supply will be developed during the reporting period, which extends to the end of the current decade.

The Defence Forces will continue to develop its environmental responsibility. Carbon neutrality goals will be advanced without compromising defence capability.

Up-to-date legislation is necessary to ensure the statutory prerequisites are in place for Defence Forces activities.

The cost savings obligations directed at the Defence Forces during previous years and the currently available resources make it challenging to maintain activities and readiness on the current level. This also restricts preparations for a crisis or warfare of long duration.

The number of Defence Forces personnel has to be gradually increased by 500 person-years by the end of the current decade. The increase is needed to maintain the readiness requirements stemming from the operating environment, to meet conscript and reservist training requirements, and develop new capabilities. More financial resources are needed to increase the number of personnel, and to increase the number of contractual military personnel needed for conscript training.

1 INTRODUCTION

The Government Defence Report to Parliament sets the defence policy guidelines for maintaining and developing Finland's defence capability. The report looks at the developments in the operating environment of defence and evaluates the needs of defence in the medium term. The Government Defence Report and its implementation ensure that Finland's defence capability meets the requirements of the operating environment.

This Government Defence Report is a continuation of the previous Government Defence Report (Prime Minister's Office Publications 7/2017) and Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy (Publications of the Finnish Government 2020:32). The analysis of the operating environment that was presented in the Finnish Foreign and Security Policy report has also guided the preparation of this Defence Report as prescribed in the Government Programme. The Defence Report has also taken into account Parliament's comments concerning the Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy.

The goal of Finland's foreign and security policy is to strengthen Finland's international position, to secure its independence and territorial integrity, to strengthen Finland's security and prosperity and to ensure that the society functions efficiently. An important objective of the Finnish foreign and security policy is to take national action and to engage in international cooperation in order to prevent the emergence of armed conflicts and situations endangering Finland's security and society's ability to act, and of Finland ending up a party to a military conflict. As a Member State of the European Union, Finland could not remain an outsider should threats to security emerge in its vicinity or elsewhere in Europe.

A strong national defence capability is a key prerequisite for achieving the goals of Finland's foreign and security policy.

Finland is a militarily non-aligned state which maintains a credible national defence capability. By maintaining its defence capability, Finland prevents the use of military force against Finland, shows readiness to respond to the use or the threat of use of military force, and the capacity to repel any attacks against our country. To strengthen its own defence capability, Finland participates in international foreign, security and defence policy cooperation, which has been increasing and getting deeper in recent years.

The preparation of the Government Defence Report also takes into account other recent publications: Government Report on Internal Security (Publications of the Finnish Government 2021:48); the Government Report on EU Policy (Publications of the Finnish Government 2021:6); and the Recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee on Crisis Management on developing Finland's crisis management (Publications of the Finnish Government 2021:18). The importance of the High North to Finland and policy guidelines on the Arctic region are covered in-depth Finland's Strategy for Arctic Policy (Publications of the Finnish Government 2021:55). The Parliamentary Committee on National Defence Obligation and Conscription that began working in 2020 will finish its work in late 2021, i.e. after the publication of this Government Defence Report.

The Government Defence Report will span over the current electoral term and until the end of this decade.

2 OPERATING ENVIRONMENT OF FINNISH DEFENCE

The security situation in the neighbouring areas of Finland and Europe is unstable and difficult to predict. The international rules-based system, international law, and commonly agreed principles have been questioned and challenged. This has a negative effect especially on the position of small states.

The security situation is affected by competition between Russia, the United States and China, as well as increased tensions that have been exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic. Great power competition, repeated violations of arms control treaties, as well as withdrawals from international treaties weaken the rules-based international system and make anticipating changes in Finland's neighbouring areas more difficult. New types of nuclear weapons are being developed. There is a threat that the threshold for using low-yield tactical nuclear weapons will decrease.

Russia is seeking to strengthen its position and to weaken the unity of Western actors. It is still aiming at a sphere-of-influence-based security regime in Europe. Additionally, the use of military force remains a central tool for Russia, and using force or threats of using military force cannot be ruled out.

The United States' goal is to maintain its position as the leading superpower that based on common interests acts together with its partners and allies. A well-functioning transatlantic relationship and the United States commitment to European defence is of great importance for the security of the whole of Europe. China's emergence as a global actor has changed the dynamics between the great powers. The potential effects of China's influencing methods on the security of the target countries is of growing concern.

Russian security thinking aims to achieve strategic depth and a broad operational area, reaching from the Arctic regions to the Black Sea and on to the Mediterranean. Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region are a central part of this larger space. Additionally, the significance of the High North in great power competition has increased as the Northern Sea Route opens up and opportunities improve for exploiting natural resources in the area. Increased international tensions in one region may rapidly lead to increased military activities in other regions as well.

From the perspective of great powers, Finland is located in a strategically important region. Moreover, from a military-strategic perspective, Northern Europe is seen as one theatre of operations during a possible Europe-wide conflict. Increased military activity in the Baltic Sea region is a sign of increased tensions in international security. The significance of North Atlantic sea lines of communication and of Finland's neighbouring Arctic regions is growing, and military activity in the area has increased.

Military force will remain one of the tools used by great powers throughout the current decade. The role of traditional military capabilities remains central in Finland's security environment. In addition to the land, sea and air domains, the importance of cyber, information, and space domains is increasing. Malicious influencing has increased and its methods diversified. The methods used include political, diplomatic, economic and military ones, as well as information and cyber influencing.

Evolving technology and digitalisation enable the use of new means of influencing, which may endanger functions vital to society and threaten critical infrastructure. The line between normal conditions and different types of conflicts, ultimately military conflicts, has become blurred. The early warning period of a conflict has shortened and conflicts have become more unpredictable. These factors place demands on developing decision-making and the execution of decisions, and particularly on developing the situational picture, readiness and early warning capabilities.

Countries in the neighbouring area have reacted to changes in the security environment by improving the readiness and materiel capabilities of their armed forces, by raising defence budgets, and by deepening defence cooperation. They have also further developed their comprehensive security arrangements, to improve their societies' resilience. The coronavirus pandemic has demonstrated the importance of armed forces supporting other authorities and society. The need for preparedness and security of supply has increased.

Sweden and Norway are strengthening their total defence to ensure a credible warfighting capability. Increasing the wartime strength of forces, bolstering conscription, command and control arrangements, readiness and the capability for sustained operations have all been emphasised in the development of their armed forces. Defence cooperation between the Nordic countries has deepened, and it seeks to develop prerequisites for cooperation even in crisis situations. The Baltic countries have continued strengthening their own national defence capabilities and NATO's collective defence.

Russia maintains significant conventional warfighting capabilities in Finland's neighbouring areas and has, during the past few years, increased its military capacity in particular in its western region. It has continued the modernisation of its armed forces,

and has developed their operating procedures by incorporating combat experiences from recent operations. The ability to make rapid decisions and the high readiness of its armed forces enables Russia to carry out rapid and unexpected operations. Different methods, such as prolonging conflicts, are used to achieve desired goals. Russia has demonstrated its ability to use this wide selection of methods in a coordinated manner, with military force still playing a central role. Russia has illegally annexed Crimea and maintained the conflict it started in Eastern Ukraine. In the spring of 2021 Russia concentrated a large number of military forces in Crimea and on its border with Ukraine. Its activities, for example, in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria demonstrate that the threshold for threatening to use or using military force to try and reach a political goal has lowered.

During the last few years, Russia has positioned some of its most technologically advanced weapons systems and increasingly more capable forces close to Finland. It regularly conducts joint service exercises, and its ability to project military force in a swift and surprising manner has improved. Long-range weapon systems, such as cruise missiles, enable Russia to extend its military capabilities beyond its borders, and restrict the freedom of action of other actors. Russia conducts exercises and operates actively outside its territory, which could escalate tensions. Furthermore, it has strengthened its strategic nuclear deterrent, and hardened its nuclear rhetoric.

The United States is committed to European defence, but expects that Europe will assume more responsibility over its own defence. The United States has increased its presence and training activities in Europe, as well as invested in infrastructure development, particularly in NATO's eastern member states. The increased operations and presence of NATO and United States in the Baltic countries and Poland have enhanced stability in the Baltic Sea region. The United Kingdom, France and Germany are significant military actors that have a large influence on the defence and security of Europe. The United Kingdom-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), the French-led European Intervention Initiative (EI2), and the German Framework Nation Concept all have a prominent role in European defence cooperation.

NATO has continued to strengthen its collective defence and deterrence, for example by improving readiness, increasing exercise activities, by enhancing defence and operational planning, reorganising its command and force structures, and by supporting the resilience of its member states. NATO takes cyber, space and information domains into account in its activities, pays increasingly more attention to northern regions, and to securing sea lines of communication in the Northern Atlantic. NATO will update its Strategic Concept by its 2022 summit. The previous update was published in 2010. NATO has a central role in European security, and a strong and united NATO is in the interest of Europe and Finland.

European Union defence cooperation has increased over the last few years. In addition to concentrating on crisis management and training operations outside its area, the Union also focuses on developing the Member States' military capabilities, on developing the foundations of European defence industry and technology, as well as on the security and safety of its citizens. With the establishment of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), EU Member States have committed to developing defence through national means and in deeper cooperation with each other. The United Kingdom's departure from the EU weakens the union as a military actor. The EU's goal is to maintain close security and defence policy ties with the UK.

The EU plays an important role as an enabler of European defence cooperation and as an actor in comprehensive security, but most European countries will continue to rely on NATO for collective defence. Cooperation between the EU and NATO has advanced in recent years, for example in countering hybrid threats and developing military mobility.

The focus of military crisis management has shifted from large, army-intensive operations to smaller operations that are more focused on train-and-advise activities. At the same time, the operational environments have become more demanding. Issues highlighted in intrastate conflicts, and especially in counter-terrorism, include a large number of actors and diverse threats as well as the absence of clear borders. Experiences in Afghanistan have demonstrated the challenges in crisis management operations and shown that their effectiveness depends on several factors. These experiences and ongoing developments in Afghanistan are likely to impact future international crisis management operations, evaluations thereof, as well as international security more broadly.

Technological advancements, particularly in the fields of digitalisation, artificial intelligence, machine autonomy and sensor technologies, affect all operating environments of defence, but the effects are pronounced in the cyber, space, and information domains. In the military context, new and emerging technologies are used, for example, in information management, in assembling and creating situational pictures, in weapon system guidance and in logistics. One objective is to support decision-making with more rapidly available and accurate information.

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan demonstrated the growing importance of remotely-piloted and autonomous unmanned systems in warfare. Critical areas of expertise also include the resilience of systems to cyber related malfunctions, management of the electromagnetic spectrum and quantum technology. The Finnish Defence Forces monitors the development of warfare and of technology. Experiences and observations of military crises are incorporated into the development of the defence system.

The operating environment of Finnish defence will remain tense and unpredictable. Thus, Finland must maintain the ability to deter aggression, and, to defend itself in all domains. Changes in the security environment challenge the resilience of the entire Finnish society. Finland's military national defence and comprehensive security will be increasingly more intertwined.

Broad-spectrum influencing

Changes in the security environment have made the concepts of hybrid influencing and hybrid warfare a permanent part of Western threat discourse. The Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy mentions hybrid influencing and its means, which include political, diplomatic, economic and military methods, as well as information and cyber influencing. Non-military methods are more common as means of hybrid influencing.

The Government Defence Report views the threats from a military perspective, considering them to be *broad-spectrum influencing*. Broad-spectrum influencing is a threat perception used in the context of Finnish military planning. It includes hybrid influencing, but it also contains the open use of military force.

Broad-spectrum influencing is systematic, combines various methods and is often used over a long period of time. Influencing may be difficult to identify, and it exploits society's vulnerabilities even during normal conditions. The influencing party tries to create circumstances that are advantageous to it, and to further its own goals by using means that are suitable for the current situation. The goal is to shake the foundations of the target country's defence capability, for example by creating uncertainty among the population, by weakening the people's will to defend the country, and by weakening the political leadership's ability to act.

In broad-spectrum influencing, the use of military force may be systematic, or the situation may inadvertently escalate into use of military force. From the perspective of Finland's national defence, exerting military pressure and the use of force are the most severe methods of broad-spectrum influencing.

Broad-spectrum influencing may include exerting military pressure, draining the resources of the defence system, and those of society as a whole. Long-term pressure has spillover effects on the target country's internal security, its international position, psychological resilience, the will to defend the country, and state leadership. Broad-spectrum influencing may lead to a military conflict either rapidly, or after a long influencing operation.

In broad-spectrum influencing, the opponent may attempt to use military methods and the threat of using them, while still below the threshold of open conflict. In such cases, declaring emergency conditions and naming the attacker becomes more difficult, forcing the defender to only operate with the powers and resources of normal conditions. The above-mentioned characteristics have been identified in recent conflicts.

3 CURRENT STATUS OF DEFENCE

The Finnish Defence Forces' most important task is the military defence of Finland. Defence capability is maintained in a way that meets the requirements of the operating environment. The aim is to prevent the use of military force or threats of military force against Finland. If deterrence fails, military attacks will be repelled.

General conscription, a strong will to defend the country, and sufficient national unity are the foundations of Finland's defence capability. A well-functioning conscription system is necessary for Finland's defence and the only way to train a sufficient number of troops to fulfil the tasks of the Defence Forces. The conscription system generates a sizeable and versatile reserve, which ensures the territorial coverage and sustainability in a long-lasting or large-scale crisis. The will to defend the country also strengthens comprehensive national defence, comprehensive security and the crisis resilience of Finnish society.

The readiness and capabilities of Finnish defence have been developed according to the guidelines set in the previous Government Defence Report, to reflect changes in the operating environment. The Defence Forces must be able to carry out its statutory tasks in all security situations. Defence capability is demonstrated during normal conditions through various actions and operations. This is one response to counter the threats of broad-spectrum influencing. Finland must be able to mobilise its defence capability in situations that develop rapidly. It is important that defence readiness can be adjusted commensurate to the threat, and also that it can be maintained during a crisis of long duration.

The wartime strength of the Defence Forces has been increased to 280,000, and readiness on land, at sea and in the air has been improved. The defence readiness requirements include cyber, space and information domains. Finland must be able to monitor all domains and, if necessary, be able to launch necessary defence measures. This requires preparedness from all of society, legislation that supports the implementation, and cooperation with international partners, as necessary.

Finland's territory and airspace are monitored and its integrity is protected in all situations by maintaining an up-to-date situational picture and by ensuring the ability to adjust readiness and respond rapidly. Improved defence readiness enables flexible reinforcement of territorial integrity surveillance and protection capabilities. This required the

development of new capabilities that can be fielded rapidly. High readiness detachments, high readiness units, conscript units and rapid reaction units can be used to swiftly begin the military defence of Finland. Cooperation with international partners supplements the surveillance and protection of territorial integrity.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Defence Forces has been able to adjust its operations quickly and flexibly to meet the challenges of emergency conditions and disruptions in normal conditions. The Defence Forces has been able to continue training and sustain defence readiness, while maintaining its ability to provide assistance to the rest of society. This has been enabled by a current situational picture, timely decision-making, as well as cooperation with other authorities and partners. When requested, the Defence Forces has supported the rest of society during the pandemic.

Changes in Finland's operating environment have required that the Defence Forces create a more comprehensive situational awareness, ensure sufficient early warning and support for decision-making, adjust readiness, as well as maintain a strong and credible defence capability. Responding to broad-spectrum influencing requires development of the comprehensive security model and cooperation between different authorities. Common situational awareness and command capabilities of state leadership and the authorities are key during a large-scale military crisis. The legislative preconditions for Defence Forces' activities have been improved based on the guidelines set in the previous Government Defence Report. The legislative work has supported enhancements in information gathering, territorial surveillance, readiness regulation, and the development of interagency and defence cooperation.

The budget increase allocated for improving readiness has been used to increase the number of exercises and for pre-prepared construction, improved availability of defence materiel stocks and command capabilities, as well as for improving readiness regulation. The implemented changes have required, and will require, ongoing updates of operating procedures. It is estimated that the defence readiness requirements set by the operating environment will remain at least on the current level during the reporting period. This has implications vis-a-vis personnel, funding, materiel quantity and maintenance. Significant further development of readiness requires additional resources.

The training of conscripts and reservists has been enhanced to meet the changes in the operating environment and in society, and to utilise the possibilities presented by evolving technology. Voluntary national defence training and the legislation regulating it have been updated. While preparing the reform of local defence, we have identified the possibilities and needs to use our sizeable reserve more effectively. In the future, local defence will have a significant role in responding to broad-spectrum influencing.

International defence cooperation supports maintaining defence capability, and its importance for Finland's defence has increased. Since the previous Government Defence Report, Finland has deepened defence policy dialogue with its partners, and signed multiple bilateral and multilateral agreements, especially with countries operating in the Baltic Sea region. The cooperation priorities are demanding exercise activities, materiel cooperation, research and development and information exchange. Defence cooperation, international exercises and crisis management operations have improved the Defence Forces' competencies, interoperability, situational awareness, as well as the ability to provide and receive military assistance. Defence cooperation has been deepened in particular with Sweden, aiming to achieve the ability to conduct combined operations.

The readiness and capabilities of the Army have been improved as the result of implementing the previous Government Defence Report. The Army's ability to respond to rapidly emerging threats has been improved by establishing high readiness units and rapid reaction units, and by developing the command structure, and by improving the ability to mobilise forces. The Army's training and education system has been developed significantly, and the changes are visible in the day-to-day activities of the brigade-level units.

The Army's mobility and firepower projects, such as the procurement of Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks, K9 armoured howitzers and supplementary procurement of anti-tank weapons, have enabled the maintenance and partial development of the most important operational and regional forces. The Army's command and control projects have improved the ability to command mobile combat operations. The protection of different forces has been improved by supplementing CBRN Defence and camouflaging material. The procurement of key land-defence-ordnance has been continued, as has improving the individual soldier's equipment. To meet the requirements of the operating environment, there is a need to further modernise the Army starting in the late 2020s, as many of its key systems are becoming outdated.

The Navy's capability for surveillance and protection of territorial integrity has been maintained and further enhanced. This has been achieved by using different vessel classes for varying tasks, by taking advantage of cooperation and capabilities of other Services and maritime authorities, and by enhancing international cooperation regarding a recognised maritime picture. The Navy's ability to repel seaborne attacks and its capabilities for securing territorial integrity and vital sea lines of communication has been improved and developed through the flexible adjustment of readiness, and by establishing high readiness and rapid reaction units.

The Squadron 2020 project is in the implementation phase, and the Pohjanmaa-class multirole corvettes will be taken into operational use by 2027. The procedures required

for introducing the corvettes into operational use have been started. Upgrading maritime surface and underwater surveillance systems has started, and the Navy is introducing a torpedo system to develop its anti-submarine warfare capabilities. The Navy's minelaying capability has been sustained, and the Navy's surface warfare capability will be maintained and developed by a surface-to-surface missile project. The project is in the implementation phase. In the coastal forces, the focus of capability development has been on improving mobility and communications systems.

The readiness of the Air Force and ground-based air defence have been maintained on a level required by the operating environment. The Air Force's capabilities for surveillance and protection of territorial integrity have been improved by introducing a new surveillance and command-and-control system. Air-to-ground weapon systems are now fully operational. Additionally, the protection of forces and systems has been improved by developing new operating procedures and by using them in exercises. The facilities and structures of Air Force bases have been improved to support the flexible use of capabilities as required by the readiness level.

Owing to the updated operating procedures and the introduction of rapid reaction units, the Air Force is able to raise its readiness and strike capability in rapidly changing situations. Currently, the capabilities and availability rate of the existing fighter fleet is at the required level. The procurement and introduction of the new multi-role fighter fleet is conducted as part of a joint Ministry of Defence and Defence Forces project. After the final procurement decision, the Defence Forces is responsible for the introduction and use of the new system. The reach of ground-based air defence will be increased by introducing high-altitude interception capability.

Replacing the main equipment of the Navy and the Air Force during this decade is of critical importance to Finland's defence capability. These strategic capability projects were initiated using supplementary funding, making it possible to continue the development of the Army, and other parts of the defence system. Carrying through the strategic capability projects and integrating the new capabilities into the defence system requires enough skilled personnel to also ensure the required level of operations while the new capabilities are being taken into operational use.

The Defence Forces has continued introducing a deep fires capability and improved target acquisition and targeting capabilities in all Services. The amount of ordnance available has been increased but has not reached the set numbers.

The Military Intelligence Act and the powers granted by it have increased the intelligence system's ability to create a situational picture and to provide an early warning to regulate readiness. In accordance with legislation, military intelligence acquires and processes

intelligence to support the decision-making of the highest levels of state leadership, and to support the execution of the statutory tasks of the Defence Forces.

Cyber capabilities are part of the modern means of broad-spectrum influencing, and the development of such capabilities has been rapid. State and non-state actors alike are active in the cyber domain.

The Defence Forces has developed its ability to create a common operational picture in cyber domain, to protect and monitor its systems, and improved the planning and execution of defensive cyber operations. The integration of cyber defence into general operational activities must continue and it must also be included in the close cooperation between different functional areas, with various authorities and the rest of society.

The military defence of Finland is dependent on society's infrastructure, and Finland's military defence uses the services of its partners in all security situations. Thus, their ability to continue functioning must be secured.

The goal of information defence is to protect the functions of national defence against the effects of externally directed or harmful communication. Information defence is one part of society's defence against information influencing. The harmful use of information is an everyday part of broad-spectrum influencing. The Defence Forces has developed its capability to monitor the information environment, protect against information influencing, and created prerequisites for operations in the information domain. Information defence has become a part of the normal activity of the Defence Forces.

Interagency cooperation has been initiated to further enhance the creation of a space situational awareness. The international treaty basis has been drafted and we will continue to expand international cooperation. A recognised and current space situational awareness helps increase the protection of society and of the defence system, and promotes the safety and sustainable use of space.

The Defence Forces has continued combining and simplifying its communication networks and information systems. The Services have their own command and control systems, as well as compatible and joint command and control systems. Development of the systems has taken advantage of standards defined in multinational cooperation forums, enabling interoperability and compatibility with the systems key partners. The command systems used by the Defence Forces have been systematically supplemented with tools and solutions based on commercial technology. This has enabled better use of widely available systems and the utilisation of conscripts' and reservists' civilian skills to benefit national defence.

In addition to using its own capabilities and the capabilities of its strategic partners, the Defence Forces also utilises the capabilities of the rest of society. Some of these capabilities are in use by other authorities, which facilitates seamless interagency cooperation when necessary. The Defence Forces maintains and protects those operational command systems that enable the creation of the Defence Forces' situational picture and command of the Defence Forces.

The logistics of the Defence Forces is grounded in a system where the services are provided by the Defence Forces and its cooperation partners, both in the private and public sector. For partners the current focus is on developing their readiness. The logistics of military units has been developed in accordance with readiness requirements, so that logistics support is also available if a situation escalates rapidly or if a crisis is prolonged. The military security of supply has been improved by deepening cooperation with national emergency supply actors. For this purpose, the Defence Forces and partner companies have organised logistics exercises together, developed partnership management mechanisms and partner companies' preparedness planning, and the creation of a situational picture.

Starting the process of raising defence readiness must be achievable by using the materiel at the Defence Forces' disposal and by using peacetime resources. Preparations have been made to start national production and services in emergency conditions. The procurement chains for materiel resupply and the ability to move forces and materiel in a crisis have been improved through multinational and bilateral cooperation arrangements. However, materiel self-sustainment is still not on an adequate level. The procurement of spare parts and ammunition especially must be continued. There are challenges vis-a-vis resourcing maintenance, as equipment and systems are becoming increasingly complex and the cost of services is rising.

The cost savings obligations directed at the Defence Forces during previous years and the currently available resources are creating challenges for maintaining activities and readiness at the current level. They are also limiting the Defence Forces' preparations for a crisis or warfare of a longer duration.

4 MAINTENANCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENCE CAPABILITY

Finland's defence capability is developed systematically, as a whole entity, and using a long-term perspective. Defence readiness and military capability for repelling attacks must meet the requirements of the operating environment. Finland's defence rests on the deterrence function of a robust military capability that is supported by the entire society. The importance of a strong deterrence function – dissuading an adversary from using military force against Finland – is accentuated in the current, unpredictable operating environment where the early warning period for military crises has shrunk and the threshold for using military force has been lowered.

The Duties of the Finnish Defence Forces

- 1) the military defence of Finland
- 2) providing support for other authorities
- 3) participating in providing international assistance, participating in territorial surveillance cooperation and in other types of international activities
- 4) participating in international military crisis management and military tasks in international crisis management.

4.1 Defence Policy Guidelines

Developments in European security affect Finland, particularly the increased military activities in the Baltic Sea region and in the High North. The operating environment of Finnish defence will remain tense and unpredictable.

Despite the increasingly tense international situation, Finland is not under any immediate military threat. Nonetheless, Finland must prepare for the use or the threat of use of military force against it. Finland's defence must be able to counter military pressure,

a rapidly developing military threat, and the use of various degrees of military force, including a large-scale military attack. The use of military force is also one of the methods of broad-spectrum influencing.

Finland maintains a credible national defence and ensures that defence has sufficient resources. General conscription, a trained reserve, defending the entire country, and a high will to defend the country will continue to be the foundations of Finland's defence. Finland will defend its territory, citizens and society with all available resources. The continuous development of defence will ensure the ability to monitor all domains – land, sea, air, cyber, information and space– and, if necessary, to initiate measures for defence.

Military national defence is an integral part of society. The conscription-based defence solution is built on a strong will to defend the country, which is sustained and fostered as a part of comprehensive security. At the core of the will to defend the country is sufficient national unity and the belief that Finland and the Finnish way of life are worth defending.

Maintaining defence requires close cooperation with different actors in society. In accordance with the principles of comprehensive national defence, we will rely on agreements and joint exercises to ensure that the resources and capabilities of other authorities and our partners are rapidly available when needed. An analysis will be conducted during this defence report's reporting period on how to develop comprehensive national defence to meet the changes in the operating environment.

The defence administration counters broad-spectrum influencing together with other actors as part of the evolving comprehensive security model. Managing broad-spectrum influencing requires foresight and preparations by a number of administrative branches, as well as deepening cooperation between public administration actors, the private sector, civil society organisations and international partners. To effectively counter broad-spectrum influencing, further development is needed in interagency cooperation, legal frameworks, national and international cyber defence cooperation, strategic communication and information defence.

In Finland, cyber security activities are coordinated by the Ministry of Transport and Communications. The Defence Forces is responsible for military cyber defence as a part of national cyber security. Improving the cyber situational awareness of the defence system and preventing and combating cyber threats requires developing information exchange procedures, powers and national cooperation structures between authorities. The demands of interagency cooperation must be analysed and defined as the basis for further development.

Threats to the cyber operating environment and related national development needs are evaluated in Finland's Cyber Security Strategy Development Programme and in a future review. The review will assess the authorities' capacity for ensuring national cyber security, for combating cybercrime, for cyber defence, and responding to rapidly developing situations that threaten the cyber security of society. Cyber defence development measures, including necessary legislative preparation, will be initiated based on the review. The purpose of development is to ensure that the cyber defence powers, skills and necessary access to information required by the security environment are in place.

International cooperation is central to Finland's cyber security and cyber defence. It is in Finland's interest to cooperate closely with international actors, multilaterally, regionally and bilaterally. This applies to both technological cooperation and to political dialogue.

Assisting other authorities has become more demanding and time-sensitive, which requires improving interagency cooperation and legislation. The Defence Forces supports other authorities according to assistance requests and cooperation arrangements.

International defence cooperation strengthens Finland's defence capability. Cooperation improves operational readiness, strengthens threat prevention, raises the threshold against military activity directed at Finland, and creates prerequisites for providing and receiving political and military assistance if needed.

Finland conducts defence cooperation based on its own premises and based on common interests. Cooperation during peacetime is a foundation for cooperation during emergency conditions. The trust required in defence cooperation is built through steady and long-term efforts. In bilateral cooperation, the focus is on countries that would be, from the perspective of Finland's defence, significant actors in Northern Europe and in the Baltic Sea region during a crisis.

Defence cooperation plays a key role in increasing Finland's situational awareness, contributing to maximum freedom of action and options for decision-making. Particularly during a potential crisis situation, it is important to be able to exchange information on how other actors see the development of the security situation and regarding what actions they are planning to take. Additionally, cooperation provides Finland with the opportunity to communicate the reasons for its actions. Cooperation also improves readiness and the ability to anticipate, as well as increases regional stability.

The defence administration actively participates in the implementation and development of arms control treaties, arms control arrangements and confidence building measures. The Defence Forces sustains and develops its readiness for supporting the above-mentioned activities. For its part, the Defence Forces prepares to prevent naturally

occurring, accidental or intentional biological threats, and to respond to them. Additionally, the Defence Forces will continue to develop the required capabilities for responding to CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive) threats through international defence cooperation. Defence administration actors have a significant role in national health security.

Bilateral and multilateral materiel cooperation creates prerequisites for cost-effective maintenance and development of materiel capability, and for military security of supply. Materiel cooperation between defence administrations supports the internationalisation and networking of domestic defence industry, and reinforces military security of supply.

Research and development is a key area of defence cooperation. It creates a knowledge base for planning and decision-making, opportunities for materiel cooperation, prerequisites for capability compatibility, for combined operations and for providing and receiving assistance.

4.2 Defence System Maintenance and Development Priorities

The primary goal of maintaining defence capability is to deter the use of military force or the threats of using military force.

Effective prevention is built on deterrence that is created by all of society and all administrative branches through different activities and preparations. The Defence Forces creates the military component deterrence. It is defensive by nature.

If deterrence fails, attacks will be repelled. In such a case, efforts will continue to be made to prevent the situation from deteriorating further, by creating thresholds that the attacker estimates to be too costly to cross. It must be possible to defend Finland using national capabilities.

The defence and operational planning of Finland's defence is based on estimates of potential military threats directed at Finland. It is estimated that military threats against Finland are likely connected to a Europe-wide crisis, or that they arise as a result of a military conflict developing in areas close to Finland. Observations from contemporary crises or military conflicts suggest that the use of methods associated with broad-spectrum influencing has increased.

In addition to other methods, broad-spectrum influencing may include exerting military pressure or the use of military force. Broad-spectrum influencing may lead to a limited or large-scale military conflict either rapidly, or as a result of a long influencing operation.

A military operation may be carried out in a swift and surprising manner using high-readiness forces and deep fires weapons systems. A limited operation may strive to gain control of specific targets or physical areas to improve military operating requirements and to influence the target country's leadership, and to affect the implementation of defence measures and functioning of infrastructure vital to society.

In a military crisis, exerting pressure on the target country and on the readiness of its defence system may take place over a period of many months. During this time, the attacker can concentrate military force in the neighbouring area, and thus enable the execution of a large-scale military operation. The objective of large-scale operations may be to break through to strategically important areas and to paralyse the defence capabilities of the target country in order to achieve the attacker's strategic objectives.

When combating broad-spectrum influencing, it is important that all actors are able to execute their tasks as required by legislation and the principles of comprehensive security. This requires close cooperation between the authorities, a comprehensive situational picture and a command system that is able to integrate many actors into it. The defence system must be able to respond to military threats as a part of broad-spectrum influencing, and to contribute to creating thresholds against other means of influencing that might weaken defence capabilities.

The means of implementing defence are being developed to better meet the changes that have occurred in the military operating environment, in warfare and threats. Finland will be defended by using all of the country's available resources, including the possibilities offered by international defence cooperation. The doctrine of comprehensive territorial defence is built on combat-effective operational forces and systems, on local defence based on a large reserve, and on evolving interagency cooperation. A key part of comprehensive territorial defence is the ability of the reformed local defence to prevent and to combat broad-spectrum influencing throughout Finland, in addition to more traditional tasks.

Finland's security environment requires maintaining at least the current level of defence readiness into the future. Surveillance and protection of Finland's territorial integrity is ensured in all security situations. Defence readiness will be developed to better include all domains.

The force structure of the Defence Forces will be reformed during the reporting period. The previously used concept of *regional forces* will be discontinued as local defence is reformed. In the future, the wartime units of the Defence Forces will be divided into operational forces and local forces. Local forces are used to create a nation-wide defence capability, to enable the effective use of operational forces, and to safeguard functions vital to society and defence. The reform increases the readiness and capabilities of local forces. The operational forces are used to create the focus of main efforts of defence, and for fast-paced, more demanding combat operations.

The usability of regular personnel as well as of conscripts and reservists in readiness-related duties will be improved by creating new operating procedures and by evaluating the necessity of legislative revisions. It must be possible to rehearse the regulation of defence readiness more flexibly and extensively.

The powers and high readiness of the Border Guard is utilised by the defence system in surveillance and protection of territorial integrity. Border Guard forces are used for land and maritime defence duties as part of the defence system when readiness is raised. If needed, the Border Guard forces can be integrated into the Defence Forces. The Border Guard's operational planning and preparations are done in cooperation with the Defence Forces. The force compositions, principles of use and the defence materiel of the Border Guard forces are developed as part of the defence system, in cooperation with the Defence Forces. The development projects take into consideration the increase in readiness requirements. In its materiel projects the Border Guard continues to take into account any defence capability requirements.

4.2.1 Land Defence

Land defence prevents, and if necessary, repels ground attacks directed against Finland. All Services participate in land defence together with Defence Command and its subordinate establishments. The Army is responsible for planning, coordinating and leading land defence. Land defence is executed by assembling the combat capabilities required by the situation and the mission, in order to prevent the capture of land areas, and by defeating a ground attack with the support of air and maritime defence. Land defence covers the territory of the entire country. Other authorities are supported in safeguarding the vital functions of society. The capabilities and organisation of the Army have been heavily invested in during the last decade, and the Army has the capabilities for defeating large enemy ground operations.

The Army will be able to maintain its capability during the 2020s with the planned resources. The principles of use, skills and equipment of the Army's operational and

local forces will be tailored to the requirements and resources of their operating areas. Developing readiness and local defence, mobile operations, and concentrating effects on key targets are areas which are emphasised. Regional battle groups will be organised as mobile and capable infantry units that are able to meet the requirements of the transformed local defence.

The Army's mobility, firepower and strike capability will be improved in the 2020s with the procurement of new armoured personnel carriers, with the mid-life upgrade of the CV-9030 infantry fighting vehicle fleet and with supplementary procurement of anti-tank weapons. Additionally, Finland is the lead nation in the EU's multinational armoured vehicles development programme which aims at e.g. improving Arctic mobility by developing a replacement for the current all-terrain carriers. The project has received funding from the European Defence Industrial Development Programme. The Army's surveillance and targeting capabilities will be improved by purchasing light UAV's and new generation night vision equipment. Some of the ageing artillery pieces will be replaced with artillery systems that have enhanced mobility and firepower. The protection of units and soldiers will be improved by purchasing CBRN defence and camouflage systems, as well as individual soldier equipment. The suitability of unmanned aerial and ground vehicles for different land defence tasks is being studied, and preparations are ongoing to use these more extensively. Development of the Army's command and control systems enables mobile command for both the operational forces and for the most important local forces.

The Army's long-range fires capability will be improved during this decade by purchasing new ordnance that significantly extends the range of the heavy multiple rocket launchers from the current 80 kilometres. The Army is also developing capabilities that enable command, control and targeting of the long-range strikes of the other Services. These development projects also take into account the capabilities gained through the Squadron 2020 and HX projects.

To meet the requirements of the operating environment in the 2030s, the Army will need to undergo a development and recapitalisation process starting late this decade, as many of its key systems are reaching the end of their life cycles. Planning continues for replacing anti-tank weapon systems, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery and ground-based air defence systems and ordnance, so that the capability to repel ground attacks is sustained.

4.2.2 Maritime Defence

Maritime defence prevents, and, if necessary, repels seaborne attacks, and secures the country's sea lines of communication and territorial integrity at sea. All of the Services

participate in maritime defence together with Defence Command and its subordinate establishments. The Navy is responsible for planning, coordinating and leading maritime defence. Readiness, fires, a recognised maritime picture (RMP), survivability, long-range strike, and underwater warfare are the focus areas of developing maritime defence. The Navy's command and control capabilities will be improved by building mobile C2-systems.

The Squadron 2020 project will deliver four Pohjanmaa-class multi-role corvettes during 2022–2027. The corvettes will be used year round for extended periods at sea, in all Baltic Sea weather and ice conditions. The vessels will be tasked with surveillance and protection of Finland's territorial integrity, command of naval operations, anti-submarine warfare, naval mine laying, surface warfare and air defence.

During this reporting period, the Navy will introduce a new anti-ship missile system, torpedoes that strengthen its anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare capability, and modernised mines. The new systems will enable regional sea control. The anti-ship missiles can also be used as surface-to-surface missiles against ground targets over 200 kilometres away. The anti-ship missile system will be installed on the Pohjanmaa-class corvettes, anti-ship missile batteries, and in the modernised Hamina-class fast attack craft. Torpedo systems will be installed on the Pohjanmaa- and Hamina-class vessels. The Hamina-class will be equipped with a new combat management system.

The preconditions for maritime defence are maritime situation awareness formed with the help of maritime surveillance and high readiness for fires. The territorial integrity of sea areas is monitored and protected together with the other services and authorities. Maritime surveillance capability is ensured by maintaining the surface surveillance systems and by beginning modernisation of the sub-surface surveillance system. The modernisation will look at new possibilities provided by unmanned systems in territorial surveillance.

The Navy's coastal forces participate in repelling any seaborne attacks. The coastal forces will hold vital areas for defence along the coast and in the archipelago, create operating conditions for the operational forces, and participate in compiling the situational awareness.

The life cycle of the coastal batteries providing regional and local firepower will reach its end by the end of this decade. The capability of the coastal batteries will be replaced so that the coastal units will retain the capability to repel seaborne attacks. Modernising the landing crafts along with other procurements will secure the coastal forces' mobility until the early 2030s. Systems will be procured to improve the command capability of coastal forces.

Modernisation of minesweeping capabilities will be started by replacing the ageing Kuha- and Kiiski-class vessels. Additionally, a project will be started for planning the replacement of surface warfare and oil spill recovery capabilities and that will reach the end of their lifecycles in the next decade.

4.2.3 Air Defence

Air Defence prevents, and if necessary, repels air attacks against Finland and secures the country's territorial integrity in its airspace. All of the Services participate in air defence together with Defence Command and its subordinate establishments. The Air Force is responsible for planning, coordinating and leading air defence. A multi-layered air defence helps to enable the mobilisation of the Defence Forces' units, and the operating requirements of land and maritime defence, by preventing the attacker from gaining air superiority and by protecting critical targets and functions. All Services develop and use air defence capabilities.

During this reporting period, the Air Force will lead the introduction of the capabilities chosen as part of the HX Programme. The new multi-role fighters will start entering service in 2025, and the decommissioning process of the legacy Hornet fleet will begin. Operational capability will be ensured during the transition.

High-altitude interception capacity and the volume coverage of ground-based air defence will be increased with the procurement of a surface-to-air missile system during this reporting period. Additionally, the layered nature and area coverage of ground-based air defence capabilities will be maintained, and the targeting capability of ground-based air defence will be developed. The Defence Forces will respond to the growing drone threat by improving its counter-drone capabilities.

The Air Force maintains a constantly updated recognised air picture (RAP) of Finland's airspace and the neighbouring areas, distributes it to the Defence Forces and other authorities, and regulates its readiness to respond immediately to potential changes in the operating environment. The integrated intelligence, surveillance and command and control system will be further developed to improve the prerequisites for leading air operations.

The pilot training of the Air Force will be adjusted to meet the increasing needs of the Defence Forces and the Border Guard.

4.2.4 Cyber, Information and Space Defence

Defence systems and capabilities are increasingly more dependent on digitalisation, information and the exploitation of space. The defence system must be able to monitor different domains more extensively, to understand the cross-effects between them, and, if necessary, to initiate defensive measures in different domains.

The Defence Forces is responsible for military cyber defence as a part of national cyber security. The goal of the capabilities of cyber defence, i.e. protection, intelligence and offensive cyber operations, is to safeguard the systems of the Defence Forces as well as others that directly impact defence capability, particularly against threats formed by state actors and state-sponsored actors. The systems must be protected so that the Defence Forces is able to carry out its statutory tasks. The Defence Forces has the obligation to counteract intelligence collection in information networks and cyberattacks against national defence and the defence system, particularly when these are carried out by a state actor. Cyber defence is conducted in cooperation with national and international security authorities, and the Defence Forces supports other authorities by providing executive assistance.

The cyber domain will be protected by raising the threshold for cyberattacks. We must be able to detect cyber threats on time and to monitor changes in the cyber environment in real time. The common cyber operational picture contributes to the detection and identification of state and other threats, and aids in preventing them from accessing systems and information central to the defence system. A better national foundation will be created for developing cyber effects and cyber countermeasures.

The importance of information defence, much like cyber defence, has grown since the last Government Defence Report. As the volume of externally directed and other malicious information, and the ways to disseminate it, is increasing, an effective information defence requires that the Defence Forces has, for example, the necessary digital tools for monitoring the information environment and for initiating defensive measures when necessary. In information defence and in responding to information influencing, it is key to be able to harmonise the information content and communication procedures among authorities and other actors, so that swift and effective responses are possible. The capabilities of information defence are developed together with other authorities and international partners, while ensuring that the legal frameworks and powers are up-to-date. While developing these capabilities, the Defence Forces will take into account measures taken by other central government entities to respond to information influencing.

Space defence is used to protect the activities of national defence and the rest of society against space-based threats, and to secure the function of space systems and

services critical to society in all conditions. The activities of the Defence Forces and other authorities are increasingly more dependent on space-based systems. A space situational awareness is the foundation of space defence. The Defence Forces will develop its ability to maintain a constant space situational awareness in cooperation with other authorities and international partners.

4.2.5 Other Joint Capabilities of the Finnish Defence Forces

Other joint capabilities of the Finnish Defence Forces include intelligence, command and control, logistics systems, special operations forces, and some of the deep fires weapon systems. Joint capabilities are used to achieve operational objectives in all states of readiness. They are used in a centrally commanded fashion everywhere on Finnish territory, and in all domains.

Military intelligence collects and processes information on military activities targeting Finland or activities that are significant in terms of Finland's security environment. It produces intelligence information to support decision-making and maintains the capability to give early warning on a military threat directed at Finland. Military intelligence procedures for supporting the decision-making of the Defence Forces' leadership and state leadership will continue to be developed. The possibilities presented by the strategic capability projects will be considered during the development of military intelligence procedures. To secure intelligence collection, the intelligence and surveillance system is being developed, and analysis and information management capabilities will be strengthened. Military intelligence works together with civilian intelligence in detecting threats against Finland. Developing the use of the powers of the Military Intelligence Act and standardising new intelligence methods as part of the organisation will continue.

The ability to have an effect on targets from a long distance away is a key part of military deterrence. High readiness and reach of deep fires restricts and limits the attacker's possibilities for using its own deep fires. The development of joint fires capabilities will be continued with purchases of ordnance for the Army, Navy and Air Force. The command capabilities, equipment and mobility of the special operations forces will be improved to meet the needs of their missions and operating environment.

The command and control system of the Defence Forces must enable centralised command and operations of the Defence Forces in all domains. The development of the command system must facilitate the digitalisation of the Defence Forces, as outlined in the Digitalisation Programme. The establishment of a new C5 School will improve experimentation and development activities that support the development of and acquisition of knowledge in the C5 field.

The Defence Forces builds and operates its own operational information systems. The communication networks of the Defence Forces will be expanded to areas that are critical to defence. In addition to its own access networks, the Defence Forces can use the communication networks of partners, commercial operators and other authorities.

The ability to command will be safeguarded and ensured through cyber defence and information security solutions. Compatibility of communication and information exchange solutions will be verified according to multinational standards. Compatibility and cost-effectiveness will be improved by taking advantage of government information systems, and by participating in their development.

The readiness and capabilities of the logistics system to support the operation of the forces and to enable the use of new capabilities will continue to be developed. The logistics support network will be updated as required by the local defence reform. The readiness to use the logistics system to support other authorities will be maintained, as well as continuing to develop it in order to prepare for crisis situations.

The contracts-based cooperation between the Defence Forces and service providers is being developed and deepened. Common training and regular testing of readiness ensure support capabilities for all security situations. Effective leadership of logistics resources of the Defence Forces and partners requires continuous development of information systems.

4.2.6 Development of Local Defence

Local defence is being developed into a military capability encompassing the entire country, which will for its part contribute to preventing and combating broad-spectrum influencing. Local forces will create a national network that is able to participate in versatile and demanding cooperation with other authorities. The local defence units can be used to assist in mobilisation; for combat; for infrastructure protection, and for supporting other authorities and society. They can be used to protect infrastructure vital to defence and society, and they can participate in restoring services after disruptions, together with the authorities and other actors. The local forces will seek to utilise the local knowledge and civilian skills of the reservists more effectively.

The strength of the local forces will be increased starting in 2025, by transforming most of the regional forces into local forces. At the same time, the local forces will be given new tasks and the standards will be raised. With this change, the local forces will include more units that can be used for combat in rapidly escalating situations. The force reserve

of the local forces will enable land defence to conduct extended combat operations everywhere in Finland.

The readiness and equipment of the local forces will be improved to meet the requirements set by the new tasks. Local forces will be called in for more refresher training and voluntary training exercises as the regional forces are removed from the force structure. Developing the local forces will create a meaningful career path for reservists in different wartime positions, and enable active participation in national defence. The importance of reservists' commitment and networking will be emphasised as the missions of local defence become more versatile. The resources of voluntary national defence and volunteer reservists will be increasingly used in training and recruiting reservists into the local forces. The ability of reservists to participate in national defence will be improved by reforming training, and by increasing the capability of the local defence units.

The brigade-level units and regional offices under the brigade-level units will retain their important role in local defence planning and execution. Local defence exercises will continue to play a key role in improving and training interagency cooperation. Exercises will be developed to suit the regional characteristics and the expanding number of missions of local defence.

4.2.7 Strategic Capability Projects

Maintaining defence capability requires that the capability of the Hornet fleet is replaced in its entirety with new multi-role fighters beginning in 2025, as outlined in the previous Government Defence Report. The new multi-role fighters are the foundation of air defence, and a necessary part of land and maritime defence as well. The fighters' capabilities will also be used to improve intelligence, surveillance, and command and control. Effective use of the multi-role fighters requires that the operating principles of air defence and of the defence system are developed, so that the new capabilities can be utilised in full. Functions, structures and infrastructure will be developed in order to optimise the use of the equipment. The fighter aircraft are expected to remain in service until the early 2060s.

The programme to replace the Hornet fleet has been ongoing since 2015, in accordance with the capability and security of supply requirements set by the Defence Forces, and the constraints set by the state leadership. Parliament has approved funding for the programme and the Government will make the procurement decision in late 2021. The effects of the capability and the lifecycle costs of the new system on the defence system will be factored in, so that they support the HX system procurement decision, while taking into account the requirements set in 2019 by the Government.

Implementation of the Squadron 2020 programme has been outlined in the 2017 Government Defence Report. The Government authorised the procurement decision in the autumn of 2019 and the project is proceeding. Squadron 2020 is the Navy's project of four multi-role corvettes that will replace capabilities of seven vessels that the Navy has decommissioned or will decommission. The construction of the first vessel is set to begin in 2022. In addition to maritime defence, the Pohjanmaa-class vessels will augment national situational awareness by generating intelligence and surveillance data from the air and maritime domains. They will participate in national air defence and deep fires.

In addition to defence tasks, the vessels will be used to support other authorities. They can also be used to participate in crisis management and in providing military assistance. The Pohjanmaa class vessels are expected to remain in service until the 2050s.

Defence system maintenance and development priorities during the reporting period:

- Maintaining defence readiness and improving materiel readiness
- Implementing strategic capability projects and introducing new capabilities into service
- Maintaining land defence and other parts of the defence system during the implementation of the strategic capability projects
- Developing local defence and local forces.

4.3 Conscription, Voluntary National Defence and Will to Defend the Country

Conscription is the foundation of the Finnish defence solution. The conscription system generates a sizeable reserve that makes it possible to defend the whole country. The current conscription system does not require significant reforms from the perspective of military national defence. However, changes related to the operating environment, population, society and technology will require developing the conscription system. By developing conscription, it is possible to create capabilities that support all of the tasks of the Defence Forces. Inclusion of citizens in national defence will be improved, by increasing participation opportunities, particularly for women, and for those in the reserve. Developing conscription includes the different phases of when a person is liable for military service: from the call-ups to conscript service, and time in the reserve.

A Parliamentary Committee on National Defence Obligation and Conscription established in 2020 will define the goals for strengthening and developing conscription. According to the appointment decision of the Committee, the development must be based on the needs of military national defence and must generate additional operational value. The identified options for development must also strengthen equality and the will to defend the country. By integrating these requirements, it is possible to ensure that conscription remains the effective and generally accepted foundation of defence. It is beneficial from the perspective of comprehensive security that the non-military service system is also developed, in accordance with the expected needs created by emergency conditions and disruptions in society.

A large-scale reform of conscript training is ongoing. The goal of the Training 2020 Programme is to use new technologies and optimised training processes to develop high-quality skills; to ensure successful selections of individuals for training during conscript service; and, to promote versatile human performance and training activities. In order to improve the selection of individuals for training, a new digitalised and AI supported selection system is being developed. The economic benefits available to conscripts during their military service will also be improved during this reporting period.

Increasing the number of women completing voluntary military service is a goal. The objective is to take advantage of the increase in the number of applicants in order to ensure the size and quality of the Defence Forces' reserve. By increasing the number of women, we will deepen the societal impact of national defence and improve the will to defend the country, and increase equality and non-discrimination.

Reservist training will be made more effective by developing the different exercise types: refresher training exercises, Defence Forces' voluntary exercises, voluntary national defence training, and independent skills training for reservists, including opportunities for firearms training. More flexible use of conscripts and reservists to support other authorities will be investigated.

The revised Act on Voluntary National Defence will further the systematic planning, preparation and implementation of reserve training. The training organised by the National Defence Training Association of Finland (MPK) and its member organisations will be developed into a cumulative and progressive package that supports military training and the needs of the Defence Forces. Additionally, the reform enables developing the cooperation of the National Defence Training Association and the Defence Forces into an operational partnership, as well as more effective harmonisation of refresher training exercises, Defence Forces' voluntary exercises and voluntary national defence.

The national defence awareness of young people will be improved. The Parliamentary Committee on National Defence Obligation and Conscription is looking into the possibilities of using the public education system to increase young people's knowledge about matters relating to comprehensive security, the national defence obligation and general conscription. The Defence Forces will develop its messaging targeted at young people as part of reforming call-ups. Furthermore, the parliamentary committee on national defence obligation and conscription will look at possibilities for expanding call-ups to include the entire age group, including women. The electronic services of the Defence Forces that are currently being developed will make it easier for conscripts and reservists to contact the Defence Forces in matters related to their service. All of these measures also seek to maintain the will to defend the country.

4.4 Focus Areas of Defence Cooperation

Changes in the operating environment have resulted in defence cooperation becoming more focused on issues relating to the security situation of the neighbouring area, changes to the threat environment and military capabilities, situational awareness, and cooperation during crisis situations. Regular and versatile international exercises are an important part of this cooperation.

During the last few years, Finland's defence cooperation has been developed actively and decisively by building a bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation network and by signing a number of defence cooperation framework documents with key partners. The focus is on maintaining the defence cooperation network and developing the contents of the cooperation. New defence cooperation framework documents may be drafted on a case-by-case basis following a deliberation and decision-making process in each case.

One of the objectives of defence cooperation is to develop ability to act together with Finland's key partners including in times of crisis. This strengthens Finland's security and creates prerequisites for coordinating and combining activities, according to separate decisions.

Matériel cooperation continues to be deepened with the Nordic countries (NORDEFECO), within the European Union framework, with NATO, and bilaterally with our key partners.

The focus of international defence cooperation in the field of logistics is on cooperation with Sweden and the other Nordic countries. This includes practicing activities related to *Host Nation Support*, and standardising associated operating procedures.

Finland continues to strengthen defence cooperation with its key partners, while ensuring that the cooperation is maintained and further developed so that it provides meaningful content. The resources required for these activities must also be ensured. The different defence cooperation arrangements complement each other.

4.4.1 Multilateral Defence Cooperation:

European Union

Deepening security and defence cooperation within the EU strengthens the Union as an independent actor and as a security community, and provides tools for developing the defence of the Member States. France and Germany have a central role, the continuation of which is necessary for deepening EU defence cooperation. Finland supports strengthening the EU's security and defence policy and actively participates in the framing of the EU's common defence policy. It is in Finland's interest that the EU is able to defend its interests, promote stability in its neighbouring regions and to support the defence of Europe, as stated in the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. Finland is ready to provide and receive assistance in accordance with the European Union's mutual assistance clause (TEU Article 42 paragraph 7) and solidarity clause (TFEU Article 222). Requesting and providing assistance is based on a national decision. Finland also participates in the exercises related to the application and implementation of these articles.

Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) has a key role in EU defence cooperation. Finland supports developing PESCO, implements its PESCO commitments and participates in PESCO projects. Another key initiative, the European Defence Fund, will create new cooperation opportunities in technology, research and development between the Member States and the defence industries of those states. Finland will take advantage of these opportunities when developing national capabilities and the industrial and technological foundations of Finnish defence. The EU's defence initiatives and new tools will be taken into account in the Defence Forces' planning, so that Finland is able to both influence their development and benefit from them. Finland will strengthen its participation in the EU's military crisis management operations.

Developing a common European strategic culture is important for strengthening security and defence policy cooperation. The EU is defining the level of its ambition on security and defence cooperation more closely with the so-called Strategic Compass, i.e. a strategic reflection and steering process that Finland actively participates in. Finland believes that the EU must be a globally credible actor that is able to promote and defend its values and interests, and one that is able to execute demanding crisis management operations independently should the need arise.

Changes in the operating environment and specifically the impacts and possibilities of technological development must be accounted for in defence capability development. This requires systematically strengthening the connections between security, defence and other EU policy sectors. From that perspective, the central entities include military mobility, hybrid and cyber threats, new and disruptive technologies, artificial intelligence, digitalisation, space, and the link between climate change and security. EU cooperation is important for improving military security of supply and the comprehensive crisis resilience of society, and for reinforcing the defence industrial and technological base.

Furthermore, closer EU–NATO cooperation is increasingly more important and adds value to responding to the challenges of the operating environment. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, located in Helsinki, is a vital cooperation partner that supports the EU, NATO and their member states in combating hybrid threats.

NATO

NATO is the key actor for advancing transatlantic and European security and stability. NATO offers Finland and other partner nations cooperation possibilities based on mutual benefits. Finland develops its partnership with NATO from its own premises and interests, and effectively employs the partnership tools and cooperation programmes provided by NATO, to strengthen its national defence capabilities.

Participation in demanding NATO exercises and crisis management develops Finland's own capabilities and interoperability with partners. Finland participates in these activities by separate decisions made by the President of the Republic and the Government's Ministerial Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. In Finland-NATO cooperation, it is taken into account that partnership cooperation neither includes any Article 5 based security guarantees nor obligations.

In addition to defence policy dialogue, capability development, interoperability and shared situational awareness, Finland cooperates with NATO in such areas as cyber defence; arms control; CBRN; developing crisis resilience; defence materiel and questions related to combating hybrid threats. The objective of research cooperation with NATO is to create compatible solutions and identify new and disruptive technologies and their effects on warfare. Cooperation with NATO also supports military security of supply.

The close cooperation among NATO, Finland and Sweden (30+2) is a key part in Finland's partnership cooperation, and it is carried out in the NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner (EOP) framework. Dialogue on the security situation of the Baltic Sea region and practical military cooperation improve Finland's possibilities to influence its security environment, and increase predictability and stability in the region. It is also in Finland's interest to

engage in dialogue with NATO on the security of the northern region and on keeping it outside of any international tensions. Promoting political dialogue with NATO is important to Finland.

Maintaining a national room to manoeuvre and freedom of choice are also integral parts of Finland's foreign, security and defence policy. This retains the option of joining a military alliance and applying for NATO membership. The decisions are always considered in real time, taking account of the changes in the international security environment. Interoperability achieved through cooperation ensures the elimination of any practical impediments to arising to a potential membership.

NORDEFECO

In addition to the founding document, signed in 2009, the development of Nordic defence cooperation (NORDEFECO) is guided by a document called Vision 2025 that was approved in 2018 and that outlines mid-term goals for cooperation. The vision states that Nordic countries will improve their defence capability and cooperation in peace, crisis and conflict, and that they ensure a close dialogue on security and defence. The goal is to strengthen each country's national defence and the ability to act together. Improving cooperation also during crisis and conflict is a new level of ambition in multilateral Nordic defence cooperation.

In order to implement the Vision, the Nordic countries will continue cooperating in areas like military mobility; comprehensive security; military security of supply; situational awareness; crisis consultations; crisis resilience; military crisis management; logistics cooperation; capability development, and training and exercises. Transatlantic cooperation will be enhanced and regular dialogue with the Baltic countries will be continued. The Nordic countries will continue seeking and working on common defence materiel projects, and developing industrial cooperation. Despite the different defence solutions of the Nordic countries, Finland sees great potential for deepening relations in defence cooperation, and participates in the cooperation pro-actively.

The trilateral cooperation between Finland, Sweden and Norway also supports achieving the objectives of NORDEFECO Vision 2025.

Country Groups

Finland supports defence cooperation between the Nordic and Baltic countries, and the cooperation between defence administrations in the so-called Northern Group. Multinational country groups, such as JEF (*Joint Expeditionary Force*), E12 (*European Intervention Initiative*) and FNC (*Framework Nations Concept*) are an important part of

the defence cooperation network. Active cooperation in the country groups supports developing defence capability, interoperability and situational awareness. At the same time, participation reinforces the EU's defence cooperation, Finland's partnership cooperation with NATO and bilateral defence cooperation. Bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation advances Finland's objectives to prevent different crises. It also improves the ability to act together with partner countries during a crisis if a decision to cooperate is made.

4.4.2 Bilateral Defence Cooperation

Sweden

Like Finland, Sweden is a country that is not a member of any military alliance. Both countries also conduct close defence cooperation with other international partners. Sweden's position as Finland's closest bilateral partner is strong. The objectives of cooperation with Sweden are to strengthen the security of the Baltic Sea region, as well as the defence of Finland and Sweden. Defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden covers times of peace, crisis, conflict and war. The framework for this cooperation is formed by the Memorandum of Understanding on defence cooperation signed by the governments of Finland and Sweden (2018).

The countries' defence cooperation includes operational planning for all situations. An example of this is the inherent right to collective self-defence as stated in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Additionally, areas of deepening cooperation include situational picture cooperation, common use of logistics and infrastructure, Host Nation Support arrangements, surveillance and protection of territorial integrity, and defence industry and materiel cooperation. The purpose of cooperation is to lay long-term foundations in Finland and Sweden for military cooperation and combined operations in all circumstances. There are no pre-set limits to deepening this defence cooperation.

Interoperability that has been planned, built and rehearsed during peacetime between Finland and Sweden aims to enable carrying out combined defence measures, including their prerequisites, based on existing plans and in all conditions.

Norway

Defence cooperation with Norway will be increased and deepened, both bilaterally and together with Sweden. Key areas in bilateral defence cooperation with Norway include defence policy dialogue; interoperability, military security of supply and materiel cooperation, including defence industry cooperation; cooperation in operational planning, and training cooperation.

The objective of trilateral cooperation between Finland, Sweden and Norway is to create prerequisites to execute military operations in times of crisis and conflict, if separately decided. Trilateral cooperation does not replace NORDEFECO, but it adds to the bilateral defence cooperation between both Finland and Sweden, and Finland and Norway.

United States

The United States is an important and close partner for Finland; defence cooperation with the United States improves Finland's defence capability. The United States is the key outside actor in Northern Europe. The US commitment to Europe, both through bilateral arrangements and through NATO, is of key importance for European security and for Finland as well. Finland will continue close cooperation and the development of its ability to act together with the United States.

The bilateral Statement of Intent mentions, for example, the following as important areas of cooperation: extensive defence policy dialogue; closer, deepening materiel cooperation, including military security of supply; information exchange; capability cooperation; training and exercises; research cooperation, and developing readiness and interoperability. New technologies, and particularly the United States' expertise in them, are emphasised in military capability development.

In addition to bilateral cooperation, trilateral cooperation between Finland, Sweden and the United States is also important, especially from the perspective of enhancing defence policy dialogue, information exchange and interoperability.

Other Partner Countries

Finland continues to also intensify bilateral defence cooperation with other countries that have signed framework documents with Finland.

The United Kingdom, Germany and France are important partners, and cooperation continues to be developed with them, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Finland considers it important that defence cooperation with the United Kingdom remains as close as possible, despite the country's departure from the European Union. Estonia is an important neighbour to Finland, including close cooperation in the field of defence.

4.4.3 Crisis Management

Crisis management is a central foreign, security and defence policy instrument used for supporting conflict resolution, stabilisation of post-conflict situations and building of

safe societies. Participation in military crisis management promotes achieving Finland's wider foreign and security policy goals, and participation is also part of international cooperation and bearing responsibility for international peace and security. In addition to helping achieve foreign and security policy goals, Finland's participation also improves national defence capabilities.

Finland will increase its participation in international military crisis management, including UN missions and operations in Africa. Finland evaluates its participation in international military crisis management from the perspective of effectiveness and national objectives. Crisis management operations are conducted in demanding operating environments where security risks have increased. While deciding on participation in crisis management operations, Finland considers both the policies outlined in the Government Report on Foreign and Security as well as national resources.

In early 2021, the Parliamentary Committee on Crisis Management drafted a comprehensive policy outline, extending over government terms. Based on the outline, the Committee issued a recommendation to strengthen military crisis management by setting the 2020 level of participation and appropriations as the minimum.

4.4.4 International Exercises

Finland will continue active participation in international exercises that support maintaining, developing and demonstrating Finland's defence capability. Exercises promote interoperability with key partners, provide information on the activities of other parties and strengthens regional security. The focus of exercises is in demanding unit and staff exercises in Finland's neighbouring areas.

In planning international exercise participation, the focus is on exercises that best develop the capabilities and skills required by the statutory tasks of the Defence Forces, as well as interoperability and readiness. Exercises that cannot be organised or it is not practical to organise nationally are important, as are exercises that include capabilities that Finland does not possess. International partners will continue to be invited to exercises organised in Finland, and it is possible to incorporate these exercises into those of key partner countries.

NATO may also invite partner countries to participate in its demanding exercises. Participating in such demanding exercises is justified from the perspective of Finland's own capabilities and interoperability. When participating in any NATO Article 5 exercises Finland's role is only that of a partner country, and Finland participates from its own premises and interests. Finland participates in international military exercises according

to guidelines given by the President of the Republic and the Government's Ministerial Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. The Parliament's Defence Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee are informed of the Defence Forces' participation in international exercise cooperation.

4.5 Essential Enablers for Defence

4.5.1 Digitalisation and Information Management

Digitalisation changes the security environment and operating models, and creates benefits with emerging technologies. Legislation, knowledge, effects evaluation and technological ability must be developed alongside emerging technologies. The goal is to manage risks associated with emerging technologies, take advantage of opportunities, optimise activities, create new services, activities and knowledge, develop new abilities, and to be involved in national decisions. A key objective is to develop abilities related to utilising information and knowledge, and leading with knowledge, which can be reinforced with different artificial intelligence applications. Applications can be used to improve the basis for decision making, since information will be available faster and it will be more accurate.

With its digitalisation programme, the Defence Forces will create prerequisites for digitalisation and the utilisation of related technology. The programme will support the introduction of emerging technologies and applications in development programmes and projects in a centralised manner. The production of network and infrastructure services and connecting operator services that are critical to the Defence Forces command system must be ensured.

By upgrading the resource planning information system and building the information management system, the technical prerequisites are created to improve the ability to support command and control and leadership through information, as well as the ability to process and analyse information comprehensively and securely. New mobile information transmission technologies such as 5G will be utilised in national defence. At the same time, vulnerabilities related to, for example, supply chains will increase, which requires the development of risk management, carried out together with other authorities. This underlines the importance of a common situational awareness, information exchange and operational cooperation between authorities. Suitable legislation is a prerequisite to ensure this. The private sector is the main developer of technology, which from a national security perspective requires well-developed regulations.

It is vital for national security and defence that information banks, communications solutions and information systems are protected from misuse. Geospatial data is a key element in information society and it often incorporates other target data as well. Detailed information or the operating processes of critical infrastructure should not be made publicly available.

Different navigation systems must enable safe operations in accordance with the requirements set by the operating environment. The usability and availability of geospatial, time and navigation data will be considered when developing defence. Military aviation and unmanned aviation will be integrated by developing airspace control in lower airspace.

4.5.2 Research and development

Technological development, particularly in the areas of digitalisation, AI, machine autonomy, sensor technologies and new domains, also have a considerable impact on the development of military capabilities. The number of autonomous and partially autonomous systems that contribute to military capabilities is increasing, which emphasises the need for cooperation between humans and machines. While taking advantage of the opportunities provided by new technology, it is necessary to take into account the related ethical challenges and legal limitations. It is also necessary to be able to respond to the threats posed by these systems.

The defence administration maintains and develops its own as well as national skills in this field, while maintaining the capacity for innovation and foresight. It also ensures support for maintaining and developing capabilities and prerequisites for international research cooperation. The defence administration concentrates its own research and development activities and resources, both in national and international research cooperation, in knowledge areas that are vital for the defence administration or which cannot be acquired elsewhere.

However, the research and development activities of the Defence Forces or occasional project funding alone cannot maintain and develop the extensive skills base needed for national defence. When directing national research and innovation policy and its resources, the needs of national defence and national security must be systematically taken into account. Ensuring critical skills and domestic security of supply and developing them further will require long-term cooperation with universities, research establishments, technology companies and the defence industry. Development costs and rising requirements place pressure on the resourcing of research and development, both nationally and within the defence administration.

4.5.3 Military security of supply and partnerships

Military security of supply ensures the operation of the Finnish Defence Forces' critical systems in all conditions. Wartime defence capability is largely based on resources available from society. Ensuring military security of supply requires that military preparedness and civilian society's preparedness for disruptions and emergency conditions are integrated, and that cooperation with the National Emergency Supply Agency and other actors involved in security of supply matters is increased. The needs and objectives of military security of supply will be reviewed when renewing the Government's decision on the goals of security of supply. Finland is dependent on the procurement and availability of defence materiel from abroad.

Production, technology and skills critical for national defence must be available and at the disposal of the defence system in all security situations. The availability of technology, and the ability to create and integrate new technology and technological solutions into the defence system cost-effectively, requires national industrial and technological skills and an appropriate production capacity. It is particularly important to ensure the maintenance of critical technological systems and the production of critical consumable material used in national defence.

A well-functioning and internationally competitive domestic defence industry, its international networks and exports contribute to maintaining the military security of supply, and improve the operational capability of national defence. The export and internationalisation of Finnish defence industry will continue to receive support. Exporting military equipment in concordance with international obligations also supports military security of supply. Responsible export control rests on careful considerations that are made on a case-by-case basis.

Partners and their subcontracting chains have a significant and established position in the defence system. They have a key role in ensuring the military security of supply, for example in relation to the Defence Forces' materiel and equipment maintenance and repair, and catering.

A partnership refers to contract-based, long-term cooperation between the Defence Forces and a private sector service provider, where the provider prepares and commits to providing the services also in emergency conditions. A strategic partnership is the closest form of cooperation between the Defence Forces and a private sector service provider. The traits that characterise a strategic partnership are mutual trust, openness, shared goals for development, as well as preparedness, continuous improvement of operating procedures, and training for emergencies during normal conditions.

The services provided by the strategic partner are of critical importance to the core functions of the Defence Forces, and they are connected to the state's key security interests. The services always include preparedness requirements that are essential during emergency conditions. A strategic partner commits to providing the services also during emergencies, and takes this into account already during peacetime.

Therefore, special attention is paid to the preparedness of partners to ensure their operation in all security situations, including personnel availability. The changes in the operating environment require that both the Defence Forces and its partners are able to react rapidly to events. The possibilities for the defence administration to affect the activities of the partners is ensured by contractual guidance, supplemented by ownership steering by the state. The cost-effectiveness of partnerships is monitored.

4.5.4 Infrastructure

Since early 2021, the management of the properties of the State used by the Finnish Defence Forces has been centralised under the unincorporated state enterprise Defence Properties Finland. Defence Properties Finland supports the readiness, preparedness and security of the Defence Forces via the usability and protection afforded by the premises, while managing rising real estate costs. This is realised by the advancement of efficient design of premises, optimisation of life-cycle costs of the properties, ensuring the health security of the buildings, and giving up old ones. Renovations will continue to be undertaken to address indoor air problems in barracks.

The required training areas and infrastructure needs dictated by the tasks of the Defence Forces will be maintained on a level required in both normal and emergency conditions, in cooperation with local actors. The Defence Forces Estate Strategy assesses the key internal and external drivers for change and development needs.

The activities of the Finnish Defence Forces are dependent on society's infrastructure, both in normal and emergency conditions. For example, Finland's airport network and air traffic control systems must enable the execution of the statutory tasks of the Defence Forces and associated training, in all states of readiness. An analysis on developing the structures needed by national defence and military security of supply will be conducted during the reporting period. The defence administration also considers it important to identify the critical physical infrastructure of the rest of society, and to develop the methods required for protecting and managing this infrastructure.

The Ministry of the Interior will examine the condition of civil defence and civil defence shelters and their distribution in Finland, and lead the necessary development actions.

4.5.5 Sustainable development and the environment

Finland and the defence administration continue implementing the UN's Agenda 2030 for sustainable development. All of the Finnish Defence Forces' national and international activities take into account the effective management of environmental risks and prevention of environmental damage. The Defence Forces will continue to develop its environmental responsibility according to its environmental strategy and the strategy's implementation plan. The Defence Forces monitors and reports on its greenhouse gas emissions.

The defence administration will advance the carbon neutrality goals set by the Government without compromising defence capability. The Defence Forces is developing its ability to use fuels and energy sources available in society. Renewing the energy system also helps to improve energy independence, security of supply and resilience of the garrisons. Security of supply, energy efficiency and emissions reduction targets will be taken into account in fuel selection.

Wind power construction must account for the operating requirements of national defence and the implementation of statutory tasks of the Defence Forces. Wind farm placement has an impact on territorial surveillance duties, the command and control systems of the Defence Forces, and on the usability of training areas. The defence administration welcomes the construction of wind power in areas where it does not interfere with the operating requirements of national defence.

The impact of climate change on security and defence has also become a theme in international defence cooperation. The defence administration actively participates in environmental cooperation within the frameworks of NORDEFECO, the European Union, NATO and the UN, and continues bilateral environmental cooperation with the United States and other countries. It participates in environmental cooperation among defence sectors in matters related to the High North and the Baltic Sea region.

The defence administration monitors the ways in which climate change impacts the operating and security environment. Adaptation needs, including weather phenomena caused by climate change, will be accounted for in planning.

4.5.6 Legislation

Legislative reforms on key laws concerning the Finnish Defence Forces were enacted during the previous electoral term. These reforms significantly improved the Defence Forces' ability to flexibly raise its readiness, and reformed the legislation concerning military intelligence. The most significant reforms still require further review and

development, to ensure that they serve their purpose and that the new, reformed provisions are implemented properly.

The Government has identified a need to re-examine the Emergency Powers Act. It is important for the Defence Forces that it is able to execute its statutory tasks in any circumstances, on the basis of up-to-date legislation.

The usability of conscripts and reservists for demanding military duties and executive assistance in different security situations will be improved, by developing operating procedures and by examining the need for possible legislative revisions. The Government has submitted to Parliament a government proposal, prepared under the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior, for a new act on executive assistance to the police by the Defence Forces. The purpose of the new act is to specify the possibilities for the police to request executive assistance from the Defence Forces.

The Territorial Surveillance Act and related regulations must be examined and revised to meet the needs of Finland's international cooperation and exercises.

Government entities have identified the need to examine the development needs of legislation related to the cyber environment, and the need to further develop and clarify interagency cooperation on national security and national defence in the field of cyber defence.

The Act on Military Discipline and Crime Prevention in the Finnish Defence Forces provides instruction on preliminary investigation tasks in the Defence Forces and on preventing and uncovering offences. An area designated for specific review is the use of force and powers, as both entities have been identified as requiring changes.

The defence administration's technical safety regulations regarding e.g. military explosives, electrical safety and transportation of hazardous materials will also be reformed. The updated regulation will also include transportation of hazardous materials in international exercises.

4.6 Personnel and Funding

4.6.1 Personnel

The Defence Forces Reform of 2012–2015 reduced the number of personnel employed by the Finnish Defence Forces to meet the tight budgetary demands of the time. Furthermore, the reduction was implemented during a lower threat level security

environment. The number of personnel employed by the Defence Forces was reduced by approximately 2,300 persons to the current 12,000 persons.

During the last few years, the Defence Forces has been given new obligations, and these changes have required an increase in the number of personnel. The security environment requires maintaining adequate readiness and the readiness to react to disruptions. Conscript and reservist training need to receive the personnel resources required to meet the objectives. International cooperation has increased, and international exercises have become more diverse and demanding. In addition, the personnel's participation in international military crisis management is important in order to develop international skills and knowledge.

The personnel's well-being at work and their performance is supported by high-quality working hours management and working capacity-management efforts, by using and developing flexible working methods and working hours, by analysing personnel survey results and reacting to identified areas of improvement. The possibility to develop the terms and conditions of both civil servants and employees will also be reviewed within constraints of the budget. Personnel numbers have a critical impact on well-being at work.

The more demanding capability requirements call for more personnel resources. In addition to developing joint and service-specific capabilities, additional resources are needed for skills related to new technologies, the development of cyber, space and information capabilities, and for implementing the military intelligence legislation.

The defence administration has for years identified the need to increase the personnel of the Defence Forces by approximately 600 person-years. Of these, approximately 100 will be realised during the current electoral term. The objective is to increase the personnel number gradually by 500 person-years by the end of this decade, so that it meets the required need. In order to meet the instructor goal of 2.5 instructors / platoon for conscripts, the number of Contractual Military Personnel must be guaranteed to the level of 350 person-years.

Evaluation of the effects of the changes in the military pension system and the retirement of the warrant officer personnel group, and the development of the personnel system will be continued.

4.6.2 Funding

Maintenance and further development of a defence capability that meets the changes in the operating environment will be ensured. Resources for this purpose will be included in

the funding framework spanning over the current electoral term. The detailed financing decisions will be taken in connection with general government fiscal plans and budgets.

In 2021 Finland's defence budget is a total of EUR 4.6 billion, which is approximately 1,8 % of the Gross Domestic Product. Calculations of defence expenditure that follow international praxis allows for the inclusion of military pensions, parts of the Border Guard's expenditures and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expenditures on international crisis management. When these are included, the share of GDP is approximately 2.1 %. The share of strategic capability projects of the 2021 defence budget is EUR 1.5 billion. The funding profile of the multi-role fighter procurement will have a significant impact on the annual variation in the defence budget during the reporting period. During the strategic project procurement period the defence budget will remain on a higher level, after which it is estimated to return to the previous level.

During this reporting period, cost-level adjustments will be made on the Defence Forces' appropriations (excluding salaries), its defence materiel procurement, and military crisis management equipment and administration funding, as an established practice.

Maintaining and developing the Defence Forces' capability is dependent on the full realisation of the funding outlined in the 2017 Government Defence Report. The capability of the Finnish Defence Forces has been maintained and developed based on this funding: partially returning to the required materiel investment levels, additional funding for improving readiness and separate funding for strategic capability projects has enabled maintaining defence capabilities on a level required by the tasks. Reallocations or cutting of the budget will create a growing challenge for the Defence Forces, weakening the long-term maintenance and development of the defence capability.

The Squadron 2020 project will replace Navy vessels that will be decommissioned, and the HX programme will replace Air Force capabilities that will be decommissioned. Parliament has approved the additional funding for both strategic capability projects in full. The index and foreign exchange costs created by the strategic capability procurements will be budgeted separately in annual budgets. The unallocated financing portions of the multi-role fighter purchase will be annually adjusted for purchasing power as necessary.

Gradually increasing the number of personnel will require additional resources. Increasing the personnel by 500 person-years requires a permanent annual indexed increase of EUR 38 million by the end of this decade. Furthermore, ensuring that 350 person-years are available for hiring Contractual Military Personnel means an annual increase of 80 person-years over current numbers.

The Parliamentary Committee on National Defence Obligation and Conscription will later define goals for its chosen areas for development. Possible programmes and achieving development goals may incur costs that are directed, for example, at call-ups and voluntary national defence. The daily allowance of conscripts and women in voluntary military service will be raised, and other economic benefits available during their military service will be improved during the reporting period.

The new Military Intelligence Act enables the use of new intelligence collection methods, which will increase the amount of intelligence information that must be processed. Information systems will be developed to reduce the amount of manual work, which on its part necessitates additional resources for both military and civilian intelligence activities. Future activities will also be outlined in the Government Intelligence Report, which the Government will give to the Parliament by the end of 2021.

Development of critical skills, digitalisation, and ensuring military security of supply require sufficient investment in defence research, development and innovation.

5 SUMMARY

1. The operating environment of Finnish defence will remain tense and unpredictable. In addition to the land, sea and air domains, cyber, information operation and space domains are emphasised. The importance of Arctic neighbouring areas is increasing.
2. Broad-spectrum influencing challenges the crisis resilience of society, defence readiness and maintenance of defence capability. This requires that the national model of comprehensive security is updated and defence is developed accordingly.
3. Close international defence cooperation strengthens Finland's defence capability. Defence cooperation improves Finland's interoperability with its closest partners in all security situations affecting Finland. Finland must be able, subsequent to a separate decision, to act together with its key partners under all circumstances, including in times of crisis.
4. Defence readiness will be maintained. The defence system will be developed to better meet the current and future changes in warfare, threats and the operating environment. Local defence will be reformed. The importance of interagency cooperation and the role of reservists will grow. A well-functioning, up-to-date and developing conscription system is the foundation of Finland's defence.
5. Finland's defence is developed with a long-term perspective, systematically and as one entity. The implementation of the Squadron 2020 and HX projects will continue. At the same time, we will ensure the maintenance of land defence and other parts of the defence system.
6. The policies of this Government Defence Report and their implementation cover a time period until the end of this decade.

Appendices (4 pcs)

- Appendix 1: The funding level of the 2017 Government Defence Report
- Appendix 2: Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund
- Appendix 3: Country groups
- Appendix 4: Concepts, definitions and explanations

Appendix 1: The funding level of the Government Defence Report 2017

The funding level of the 2017 Government Defence Report consist of three entities:

- The additional resources needed annually to improve readiness due to changes in the security environment were estimated to be EUR 55 million since 2018. Based on that, the Finnish Defence Forces operating expenses have received an increase of EUR 50 million since 2018.
- In accordance with the recommendation of a Parliamentary Reporting Group it was estimated that the annual resources needed to maintain the current materiel investment level in the Defence Forces is EUR 150 million in addition to the index raises starting in 2021. As agreed, the above-mentioned increases have been accounted for in the funding given to defence materiel projects.
- The preparations of strategic capability projects of the Navy and Air Force (Squadron 2020 and HX) will be continued and the decommissioned capabilities will be replaced. The projects will be carried out using budget funding 2019–2031. The Finnish Parliament made the key decisions concerning the funding of Squadron 2020 in the 2018 budget, and the multi-role fighter procurement funding was decided in the 2021 budget.

The following factors have impacted the funding level prescribed in the 2017 report:

- The Finnish Defence Forces operating expenses announced in the 2017 budget were cut by EUR 27 million based on the 2015 government programme.
- Starting from 2020, the operating expenses of the Finnish Defence Forces have been given a gradually increasing 0.3 % cost savings requirement related to digitalisation and improving productivity (the so-called general government cost savings). The Government decided in the spring of 2020 that the cost savings will not be continued from 2023 onwards, which means that the permanent annual cuts are approximately EUR 19 million.
- Based on the 2019 Government Programme, the appropriations of the Finnish Defence Force will be gradually increased by a total EUR 10 million by 2023. The increase will be used for increasing the number of personnel and positions, for increasing the number of refresher training exercises, and for voluntary national defence. In addition, there have been numerous smaller and one-off increases of funding.
- With the general government fiscal plan of 2022-2025, the Government decided to cut EUR 35 million from the Ministry of Defence main title of expenditure starting in 2023. Additionally, a EUR 2 million travel budget cuts were directed at the administrative branch, starting in 2023.

Appendix 2

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)

The Council of the European Union adopted a decision establishing the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in December 2017. All EU Member States are taking part in PESCO, except for two countries (Denmark and Malta).

The aim is to promote the EU's goals, help Member States to improve their defence capabilities and deepen defence cooperation among Member States. PESCO has a two-layer structure:

1. The participating Member States have undertaken binding commitments, subject to annual regular assessment.
 - In the areas of **defence investment**, the participating Member States commit to e.g. increasing defence budgets and increasing investments, research and development.
 - In the field of **defence system harmonising**, the focus is on, for example, active participation in the *Coordinated Annual Review on Defence* (CARD) and cooperation within the European Defence Fund framework.
 - Commitments in **deployability of forces** include participation in CSDP operations and in European Union Battle Groups, and expanding the common funding of operations.
 - Regarding capability shortfalls, the PESCO countries commit to finding primarily common European projects in procurement, and to participate in at least one PESCO project.
 - In **European equipment programmes** the emphasis is on the *European Defence Agency's* (EDA) role in capability cooperation, and its support to strengthening the foundations of European defence industry.
2. The binding commitments are implemented through PESCO projects, where Member States participate within their means and capabilities. There are a total of 46 projects, Finland has a participating status in four projects and an observer status in eight projects (2021).

PESCO is divided into strategic phases, the two first phases being 2018–2020 and 2021–2025. The Council specifies at the beginning of each phase the more precise objectives for meeting the binding commitments. Participating Member States have to communicate every year a national implementation plan, outlining how they intend to meet the binding commitments and what they plan to do in the future.

European Defence Fund (EDF)

In the summer of 2018 The European Commission proposed a European Defence Fund as part of the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2021–2027. The European Defence Fund fosters joint innovation, research and development in defence technology and equipment.

The funded projects cover the entire research and development cycle of defence materiel. The Fund's aim is to foster the global competitiveness, efficiency and innovation capacity of the European defence industry and research actors, and thus advance the EU's strategic autonomy. Additionally, the Fund's aim is to encourage taking advantage of synergies and reducing duplication in the defence industry, and to strengthen an open single market for defence in the EU.

The Fund started in 2021, and it is operated based on annual work programmes. Its budget for seven years is EUR 7.953 billion euros (current prices).

Projects are funded mainly through competitive calls. The beneficiaries are primarily industry and research consortiums, and the amount of awarded EU funding depends on the nature of the project. Defence research may be funded in full, but additional funding from Member States or industry is required in development projects.

Projects supported by the Fund must be done as a collaboration between at least three companies or research establishments located in three different countries. The goal is to promote particularly the participation of small and medium sized enterprises, as well as midcaps in development projects. This is done by using different types of bonuses. The proposals for funded projects are evaluated using criteria that are defined in EU regulations. The evaluation focuses, among other things, on quality and effectiveness of activities, breakthrough potential, innovation and technological development, the competitiveness of European defence industry, the EU's security and defence interests, and increasing cross-border cooperation.

Appendix 3

COUNTRY GROUPS

Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)

The Joint Expeditionary Force is a multilateral defence cooperation framework, led by the United Kingdom, and consisting of ten countries: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Finland joined JEF in the summer of 2017, along with Sweden.

The purpose of JEF cooperation is to develop the military readiness of the participating countries, to prevent different types of crises, and if necessary, to work together in crisis situations. Training together and coordinating military exercise activities between the participating countries is an important part of JEF. Combined exercises mainly take place in Northern Europe.

The JEF framework can be utilised in a variety of operations. The Joint Expeditionary Force may not necessarily operate alone, but it can be used to support, for example UN, NATO or EU operations. A tailored force will be stood up for each mission and situation, and each country decides on possible participation based on national legislation.

European Intervention Initiative (EI2)

The European Intervention Initiative was launched by France in June 2018, and Finland joined it in November 2018. The following 13 countries are currently participating in the initiative: Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

The purpose of the EI2 is to develop European strategic culture, to support the creation of a common situation picture, the capacity for prediction and sharing of information, and to develop Europe's readiness on the politico-strategic level in order to respond to the crises and security challenges facing it.

The development of a common strategic operating culture strives to support the ability of European countries to initiate and execute military missions and operations within the framework of EU, NATO, UN or a situation-specific country coalition.

Framework Nations Concept (FNC)

A total of 21 countries are part of the Framework Nations Concept, which is led by Germany. Finland, Austria and Switzerland joined in 2017 and Sweden joined in 2018. The Framework Nations Concept includes many important partners for Finland in the Baltic Sea region and in Northern Europe, such as Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden.

Cooperation within the Framework Nations Concept improves the international interoperability of the Finnish Defence Forces, and supports the maintenance and development of the defence capability. Participation in the Framework Nations Concept also supports EU defence cooperation, Finland's partnership cooperation with NATO, and bilateral defence cooperation with Germany.

The Framework Nations Concept includes activities which aim to fill European capability shortages. Finland's participation in the aforementioned activities is based on the needs of the Defence Forces. Finland has not earmarked any forces to Framework Nations Concept Larger Formations.

Appendix 4: Concepts, definitions and explanations

Many of the concepts also have so-called common language and other meanings. Some concepts have been explained below, instead of defining them.

CBRNE

A CBRN threat refers to incidents (incl. armed use) caused by the use of chemical (C), biological (B), radiological (R), nuclear agents (N) and explosives (E), as well incidents caused by the misuse of expertise related to them.

Comprehensive National Defence

Comprehensive national defence includes all the national and international military and civilian activities that secure the prerequisites of military national defence during emergencies.

Comprehensive security

Cooperation between the authorities, businesses, organisations and citizens to attend and safeguard the functions that are vital to society. The following functions are defined as vital: leadership; international and EU activities; defence capability; internal security; economy, infrastructure and security of supply; functional capacity of the population and services; psychological resilience. The content and implementation of comprehensive security is described in the Security Strategy for Society. A new strategy will be released in the autumn of 2022.

Cyber Operating Environment and Cyber Security

A cyber operating environment consists of one or more information systems that are meant for processing data or information in electronic form. Cyber security is a state where the threats and risks posed against functions vital to the society or other cyber environment- dependent activities are managed in a cyber operating environment.

Defence capability

In this Defence Report defence capability refers to the ability of the Finnish defence system to defend the country, and the ability of the Finnish Defence Forces to carry out its tasks as part of the defence system.

Defence cooperation

Defence cooperation refers to the international, bilateral and multilateral defence policy and military cooperation done under the guidance of the Ministry of Defence in order

to support and strengthen Finland's defence capability, and to improve interoperability. International exercises and international materiel cooperation are a part of defence cooperation.

Defence system

A defence system is a systems perspective on national defence. In this Defence Report *defence system* describes Finland's national defence as a collection of various sub-systems, and the Defence Forces as one part of that defence system.

A defence system is an entity of military defence and other comprehensive national defence actors. It creates the defence capability section of society's comprehensive security.

The defence system produces military defence capability through the activities of Defence Forces' command echelons, units and systems. The entity of defence capability includes other activities of comprehensive national defence which are led by the state leadership. Those other highlighted entities are strategic communications, society's resilience and security of supply, interagency cooperation, international defence cooperation, and voluntary defence.

The defence system may be divided into sub-systems that include the personnel, materiel and knowledge needed to carry out the tasks of military national defence, as well as the other activities and resources of comprehensive national defence. Military sub-systems include intelligence and surveillance systems, command, combat and logistics systems, as well as force production and resource planning systems.

The Defence Forces is responsible for developing the military part of the whole and participates as an expert in developing the other parts and activities of the defence system. The military sub-systems are developed on capability basis to respond to the estimated threat and to meet the tasks set for them. The military capabilities of the Border Guard are developed as part of the defence system.

Geospatial information

Geospatial information is information about a target at a known location, and it always includes a reference to a certain place or area. It can also describe any other activity or phenomenon that has a location. Geospatial information is an information entity created by the attribute value that describes the properties of the location information, target or phenomenon.

Host Nation Support

Host Nation Support refers to activities that the Host Nation carries out upon a separate agreement, in order to support and enable the activities of forces of another state during peacetime, in emergency conditions and during a crisis or a conflict.

Hybrid influencing

Hybrid influencing does not have an internationally accepted, common definition. There are multiple, additional terms that are similar and alike in meaning (hybrid threats, hybrid influencing, hybrid operations, hybrid warfare). The use of the terminology in Western security discourse is mainly clear and easy to grasp, but there are differences in emphasis and in the range of the methods. Although the range of methods is understood to be wide, the descriptions often focus on cyber and information operating domains, for instance. The Government Defence Report looks at this topic as broad-spectrum influencing, from the perspective of military threats and readiness.

The 2020 Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy describes hybrid influencing in the following way:

“In hybrid influencing, a state or other external actor systematically employs a variety of methods, concurrently or sequently, with an aim to influence the target’s vulnerabilities to reach its own goals. The range of methods is wide, including political, diplomatic, economic and military methods, and informational and cyber. The influencing is injurious, and the actors strive to implement it in such a manner that their involvement in the actions can be denied.”

Local forces

Local forces are wartime units used for local infrastructure protection, combat and support tasks: they are used to create a national coverage by surveilling areas, mobilising units, by protecting and defending infrastructure and by supporting other authorities. The local defence reform improves the readiness and capabilities of the local forces and increases their presence around the country.

Military capability

A military capability is formed by plans enabling the operating of a system and/or a force and operating and use principles practised for different duties as well as competent personnel, mission essential equipment, mission necessary infrastructure and the support opportunities provided by either the Defence Forces or society at large.

Operational forces

Wartime forces meant to be used all around the country: they are trained and equipped for many types of different combat missions in different operating conditions. Depending

on the situation, the operational forces are used to create the areas of main effort for defence, and for the most demanding combat operations.

Regional forces

Wartime forces meant to be used in regional combat: they are trained and equipped to undertake combat missions in the different conditions of their area of operations. This particular concept of regional forces is phased out with this Government Defence Report. The majority of the regional forces will be reclassified as local forces, and some parts will be incorporated into the operational forces.

Resilience

The ability of individuals and communities of maintaining their performance in changing circumstances, the readiness to face disruptions and crises and the ability to recover from them. The term *resilience* is partially used to mean the same as *crisis resilience*.

SNELLMANINKATU 1, HELSINKI
PO BOX 23, 00023 GOVERNMENT, FINLAND
valtioneuvosto.fi/en/
julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi

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